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ANALYSIS: THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
MICHAEL ATKINS
Introduction
In March 1968, crude oil was discovered on Alaska’s North Slope. The
field, at Prudhoe Bay on the Beaufort Sea, was estimated to contain 9.7
billion barrels’ worth of the fossil fuel.1 In July 1977, one of those barrels
emerged at a terminal in Valdez, on the opposite end of America’s largest
state, having flowed southward for 38 days through an 800-mile-long, 48inch-diameter pipeline that took two years to construct.2 That barrel was
followed by many more. Soon, the sleepy port town of Valdez was bustling
with massive oil tankers, which maneuvered around the islands of Prince
William Sound, negotiated through the Valdez Narrows, filled their tanks
with the coveted commodity, and then navigated along carefully plotted
tracklines back south, onward to refineries in warmer climes. Late in the
evening on March 23, 1989, one of these ships topped off its tanks, cast off
its mooring lines, cleared its berth at the Valdez terminal, and set sail for
the southern California port of Long Beach. The Exxon Valdez was a
colossal structure, a so-called supertanker, measuring 987 feet long and 166
feet wide, powered by a 31,000-horsepower main engine and boasting a

 Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022. I am grateful to Prof. Bruce Huber for
his guidance and instruction throughout this research. Special thanks also to the ONE J staff
for the thoughtful edits and insights.
1. See Wallace Turner, The Man Who Built Alyeska, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 26, 1977),
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/26/archives/spotlight-the-man-who-built-alyeska.html.
2. See ANDREW INKPEN & MICHAEL H. MOFFETT, THE GLOBAL OIL & GAS INDUSTRY:
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY AND FINANCE 409 (2011).
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deadweight capacity of 214,861 tons.3 When delivered in 1986, it was the
largest ship ever built on the west coast of the United States. Around
midnight, the ship had cleared the Narrows, and Captain Joseph
Hazelwood, a good sailor with a bad drinking problem, took the conn from
the state-licensed harbor pilot. Hazelwood radioed the Coast Guard,
requesting and receiving permission to cross over to the inbound shipping
lane to avoid icy conditions along the outbound track. This diversion was a
standard move, but it put the Exxon Valdez in the path of an underwater reef
off Bligh Island, necessitating an abrupt change in course around Busby
Island, north of the reef. Two minutes before the required turn, Hazelwood
inexplicably left the navigation bridge, descending to his stateroom below
and leaving the helm to an inexperienced and overworked third mate. The
turn was missed. The ship struck the reef. Eight of its 11 cargo tanks
ruptured, spilling 258,000 barrels of Alaskan North Slope crude oil into the
pristine waters of Prince William Sound.4
The grounding of the Exxon Valdez is still regarded as the worst oil spill
ever from a ship. Westerly currents carried much of the 11 million gallons
of unrefined petroleum onto the coasts of Kenai Peninsula, Cook Inlet, and
Kodiak Island, soiling 1,300 miles of shoreline.5 Effects on fishing, both
commercial and subsistence, as well as local businesses ashore, ranged
from disruptive to devastating. An estimated 250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea
otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, and 22 killer whales died, along
with an untold number of salmon and herring eggs.6 Thousands mobilized
for the herculean task of cleaning up the mess. Controversies emerged over
chemical dispersants and corporate obfuscations. Finger-pointing and
blame-shifting spread as perniciously as an oil slick in water, keeping a
frenzied media well-fed. Hazelwood proved a serviceable villain. An
official inquiry revealed two drunken driving arrests on his record,
including one in New Hampshire just six months before the accident in
Valdez.7 He had completed a month-long alcohol treatment program while
at Exxon but had stopped attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
Internal medical records, dated 1985, revealed he was “depressed and
3. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD. (NTSB), MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT NO.
NTSB/MAR-90/04, at 15-24 (Jul. 31, 1990).
4. See id. at 28.
5. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (D. Alaska 2002), vacated and
remanded (Aug. 18, 2003).
6. Exxon Valdez, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://darrp.noaa.gov/
oil-spills/exxon-valdez (last visited May 12, 2022).
7. NTSB, supra note 3, at 31-33.
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demoralized” and had taken to “drinking excessively, episodically, which
resulted in familial and vocational dysfunction.”8 At a trial, witnesses
testified Hazelwood spent the evening hours of March 23 at the waterfront
bars in Valdez, consuming at least five double vodkas before taking
command of the ship.9 Hazelwood’s penchant for alcohol, however, was
only part of the story. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
investigation ultimately found a litany of probable causes:
[T]he failure of the third mate to properly maneuver the vessel
because of fatigue and excessive workload; the failure of the
master to provide a proper navigation watch because of
impairment from alcohol; the failure of Exxon Shipping
Company to provide a fit master and a rested and sufficient crew
for the [ship]; the lack of an effective Vessel Traffic Service
because of inadequate equipment and manning levels,
inadequate personnel training, and deficient management
oversight; and the lack of effective pilotage services.10
The scale of this ecological disaster, the preventability of its causes, and
the inadequacy of the response all captured national attention, sowing anger
and frustration, and catalyzed political will in Washington. The legislation
that resulted, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),11 is the subject of this
paper. Congress enacted OPA “to streamline federal law so as to provide
quick and efficient cleanup of oil spills, compensate victims of such spills,
and internalize the costs of spills within the petroleum industry.”12 Indeed,
OPA created a comprehensive oil spill liability and compensation scheme,
activated a fund for response efforts and damages in the aftermath of such
an event, and imposed upon the industry a suite of rules aimed at preventing
8. Id.
9. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 US 471, 476-78 (2008); see also NTSB, supra
note 3, at 31. Blood samples collected 11 hours after the grounding indicated a .061 blood
alcohol content (BAC). Captain Hazelwood was prosecuted by the State of Alaska for
operating a watercraft while intoxicated, reckless endangerment, negligent discharge of oil
and three felony counts of criminal mischief. Nine years after the grounding, a single
misdemeanor conviction was affirmed on appeal. See In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.Supp. 2d at
1047-48. The Coast Guard suspended Hazelwood’s mariner license for nine months. See
Seth Mydans, Captain in Alaska Oil Spill Loses License for 9 Months, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 26,
1990), https:// www.nytimes.com/1990/07/26/us/captain-in-alaska-oil-spill-loses-license-for9-months.html.
10. NTSB, supra note 3, at v.
11. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
12. Rice v. Harken Expl. Co., 250 F.3d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2001).
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or mitigating damage in future oil pollution incidents. In many ways, OPA
amalgamated the legal patchwork that preceded it. In others, it reached far
beyond the status quo of March 1989, overcoming political partisanship to
marshal needed improvements in global shipping. This paper focuses on
two of OPA’s nine titles: Title I, which covers liability and compensation
resulting from the release of oil into U.S. waters, and Title IV, which
specifies measures of prevention and removal of oil, as well as penalties for
non-compliance. The effort here is expository, and apart from a nod to the
bipartisanship of a bygone era, no grand arguments or cutting critiques are
being advanced in these pages. The aim is simply to outline the main
provisions and the case law, as well as provide an overview of the legal and
regulatory framework existing before and after the Exxon Valdez ran
aground that calm, chilly night at Prince William Sound.
The Background
The inadequacies of existing law and the risks associated with the
shipment of oil by sea entered the collective consciousness in March 1967,
when the Torrey Canyon, an American-built, Liberian-flagged tanker,
struck Pollard’s Rock, a reef off the coast of Cornwall, England, and spilled
more than 100,000 tons of crude oil into the English Channel. 13 The sludge
fouled British and French beaches, killing thousands of sea birds, and the
misadventures that followed might have been amusing in any other context.
To burn off oil seeping from the wreckage, the Royal Air Force dropped 42
bombs, a quarter of which missed the target, while a contingent of French
soldiers deployed to the beaches of Perros-Guirec armed with rakes and
shovels.14 Less comical and more consternating was the agedness of
appliable law. The Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act), enacted in
1851, limited a vessel owner’s liability to the post-casualty value of the
vessel.15 Conceived as a means “to encourage ship-building and to induce
capitalists to invest money in this branch of industry,” the Limitation Act
was not a model of clarity, “badly drafted even by the standards of the
time.”16 In the case of the Torrey Canyon, under the Limitation Act,
compensation for an $8 million cleanup operation would have been limited

13. Bethan Bell & Mario Cacciottolo, Torrey Canyon oil spill: The day the sea turned
black, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-39223308.
14. Id.
15. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a).
16. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 447 (2001) (quoting 2 T.
Schoenbaum, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 299 (2d ed. 1994)).
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to $50, the value of the ship’s sole surviving lifeboat.17 By the latetwentieth century, such a scheme was particularly anachronistic, given the
intervening evolution of the industry. A glance at this history underscores
the point. The first modern tanker, the British-built German Glückauf, was
launched in 1886 and rated at 2,300 gross tons.18 By the 1920s, the
maximum size had reached 20,000 deadweight tons (dwt).19 For reference,
the American T-2 tankers that provided underway replenishment vital to the
Allied effort in World War II had a capacity of 16,500 dwt.20 The post-war
expansion of the global oil trade ushered in staggering increases in tanker
size. In 1959, the Universe Apollo became the first 100,000 dwt ship. Seven
years later, the Idemitsu Maru reached 210,000 dwt. In the 1970s, tank
ships of 300,000 dwt were not uncommon.21 The era of the supertanker had
dawned. And while the extreme growth in physical size and carrying
capacity eventually plateaued,22 the state of oil spill liability law, as drawn
up in the mid-1800s, was untenable.
Following the Torrey Canyon and a spate of other disasters,23 Congress
passed a number of environmental laws, and by 1989, no fewer than five
federal statutes governed, to some degree, oil spill liability and
compensation in the United States: the Clean Water Act (CWA),24 a 1972
amendment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA); the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),25 the primary pollution
provisions of which had been added in 1978; the Deepwater Port Act of
1974 (DWPA);26 the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1993
(TAPAA);27 and the outmoded Limitation Act. More law did not

17. Jeffrey D. Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 1, 2
(1994).
18. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY 278 (2018).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The world’s largest tanker ever was the Seawise Giant, at 564,763 dwt. Id.
22. This happened for several reasons, including size constraints on vessels traversing
the Suez and Panama canals.
23. See, e.g., Christine Mai-Duc, The 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill that changed oil and
gas exploration forever, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/|
la-me-ln-santa-barbara-oil-spill-1969-20150520-htmlstory.html.
24. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816.
25. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92
Stat. 629.
26. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126.
27. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576.
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necessarily mean good law. While the CWA imposed strict liability and
cleanup costs on a spiller of oil, there were distinct, dollar-amount limits to
that liability unless the spill was caused by willful negligence or
misconduct.28 And apart from the Limitation Act, the other laws on the
books were narrowly suited to particular activities or locations. A
congressional report summarized: “[T]here is a fragmented collection of . . .
laws providing inadequate cleanup and damage remedies, taxpayer
subsidies to cover cleanup costs, third party damages that go
uncompensated, and substantial barriers to victim recoveries – such as legal
defenses, statutes of limitation, the corporate form, and the burdens of proof
that favor those responsible for the spill.”29 Of note, there had been at least
one prior attempt to enact a comprehensive oil pollution liability and
compensation measure. During the drafting of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA),30 lawmakers had included oil-specific measures, but ultimately
these were dropped in favor of rules for hazardous substances.31
Before outlining the buildup to OPA’s enactment, it is worthwhile to
review the legal consequences that befell Exxon in the years that followed
the grounding and spill at Prince William Sound. A necessary preface:
Under the CWA, state-imposed liability for spills were not preempted, and
private parties could still recover losses, but only under the principles of
maritime tort law.32 To start with the ending of this two-decade drama: In
2008, a split Supreme Court held in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker that a
shipowner (like Exxon) could be derivatively liable for punitive damages
when a managerial employee (like Hazelwood) engaged in reckless acts
(like spilling 11 million gallons of oil), but maritime common law limited
those damages to the amount of compensatory damages awarded by the
jury.33 The decision arose from a consolidated civil action against Exxon
and Hazelwood, brought by more than 32,000 commercial fishermen,
Native Alaskans, business owners, and others. At trial, the jury had
awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion

28. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1). An oil-carrying vessel, for example, would only be required
to cover $250,000 or $150 per gross ton, whichever was greater. Id.
29. S. REP. NO. 101-94 (1989).
30. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
31. Michael P. Donaldson, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction and Response, 3
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 288 (1992).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o).
33. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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against Exxon.34 The Ninth Circuit remanded twice, and the award had been
lowered to $2.5 billion by the time it reached the high court. In a
characteristically detailed decision by Justice Souter, the Court fashioned a
common law rule that limited punitive awards in maritime cases to a 1:1
ratio with total compensatory damages, in this case, $507.5 million. The
Ninth Circuit applied the ruling on remand, compelling payment in that
amount plus 5.9 percent interest that ran from the original 1996 trial
judgment.35
The ledger of remittances Exxon made after the grounding included: $2.1
billion in cleanup costs; $125 million in criminal fines and restitution for
violations of the CWA and other laws; $900 million in civil penalties for
restoration of natural resources – land, water, wildlife – under a consent
decree with the United States and Alaska; $303 million in voluntary
settlements with fishermen, property owners, and other claimants; $507.5
million in compensatory damages, which represents an aggregation of 21
distinct payouts, settlements, and verdicts;36 $507.5 million in punitive
damages, in accord with the Supreme Court’s 1:1 maritime common law
rule; $470 million in interest that compounded annually at 5.9 percent after
1996; and $70 million in court costs.37
Doing the math, one arrives at a very large sum – right around $5
billion – and the above list likely fails to account for other ancillary costs
incurred along the way. But to be sure, this defendant is doing just dandy.
In a recent 90-day span, for reference, Exxon collected a net profit of $2.7
billion.38 Indeed, those feeling sympathy for Exxon should take the rag
away from their faces, to paraphrase Bob Dylan, because now ain’t the time
for tears. And, to double down on poetic allusions from the 1960s, this legal
saga ended not with a bang but a whimper: In 2015, the Department of
34. For practical reasons, this paper refers simply to “Exxon” as the corporate owner of
the Exxon Valdez. In the aftermath of the spill, Exxon rebranded its subsidiary Exxon
Shipping as SeaRiver Maritime. In 1999, Exxon Corporation merged with Mobil to form
ExxonMobil Corporation.
35. Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil, 568 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009).
36. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (D. Alaska 2002), vacated and
remanded (Aug. 18, 2003).
37. On remand, the Ninth Circuit panel determined Exxon was on the hook for its own
court costs, which became a contentious point because of the size of a supersedeas security
bond Exxon posted to sustain its appeals, as well as the duration of appeals. See Exxon
Valdez, 568 F.3d at 1082 (9th Cir. 2009).
38. Christopher M. Matthews, Big Oil Companies Recover as Prices Rebound, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chevron-returns-toprofit-as-oil-rebounds-from-pandemic-11619778764.
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Justice announced it was abandoning efforts to collect further damages by
way of a reopener clause included in the consent decree referenced above.
That clause, titled “Reopener for Unknown Injury,” allowed the state and
federal governments to pursue, with conditions, an additional $100 million
for any unforeseen, substantial damage to populations, habitats, or species
not anticipated when the parties settled in federal district court in 1991. In
2006, surveys conducted as part of a habitat restoration plan identified
patches of oil in subsurface sediments and rocks on beaches within the spill
zone. Of particular concern were two species – harlequin ducks and sea
otters – that foraged in the beach sediment along Prince William Sound.
Further research, however, revealed the animals had recovered to their prespill population levels.39
Rewinding to March 1989, Democrats at the time were in control of both
the House of Representatives and Senate, while George H.W. Bush, a
Republican, was President. Bipartisanship of that era, unrecognizable by
today’s standards, sustained the inertia needed to enact OPA. Even still, it
took 18 months. One sticking point during congressional debates was the
inclusion of a $75 million cap on oil spill damages resulting from offshore
drilling accidents.40 A concern was that without such a cap, small,
independent drillers would be effectively eliminated from the industry.41
Although smaller companies lobbied successfully for that limit, as enacted,
the cap applies to drilling operations of all sizes. And while $75 million
might have seemed like a healthy amount in 1990, by the time an explosion
rocked the semi-submersible rig Deepwater Horizon, spewing nearly 5
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico two decades later, the sum
seemed rather paltry.42 Other areas of disagreement in Congress involved
the implementation schedule for double-hull requirements for tank vessels
and the absence of any preemptive effect on state liability schemes. Both
issues – discussed in more detail below – had stalled earlier attempts to
create a singular regulation covering all spills.

39. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, United States and the State of Alaska Opt
Not to Recover Additional Damages from Exxon Mobil Under Reopener Provision of 1991
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Settlement (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/unitedstates-and-state-alaska-opt-not-recover-additional-damages-exxon-mobil-under-reopener.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3).
41. Anne C. Mulkern, How Long to Pass an Oil Spill Bill? Try 18 Months, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 2010), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/12/12green
wire-how-long-to-pass-an-oil-spill-bill-try-18-mont-13939.html.
42. BP waived this limit after the Deepwater Horizon incident. See id. The limit
applicable to offshore facilities has since been increased by regulatory action.
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OPA was a popular bill, no doubt buoyed by still-fresh memories of the
disaster in Alaska and even amassed support from representatives of the oil
and natural gas industry. The House bill passed 375 to 5, while the Senate
version passed by voice vote. The final bill out of committee passed both
chambers unanimously.43 President Bush signed OPA into law in August
1990. Below is a summary of the main statutory provisions, followed by a
discussion of criticisms that appeared in a signing statement from the
President.
Provisions of Consequence
OPA brought to bear conventional elements of environmental law, such
as the well-established “polluter pays” principle, but eschewed other longheld doctrines, like the Robins Dry Dock common law rule narrowing
recovery of economic losses in marine casualty suits to damage to property
owned by the plaintiff.44 Many provisions of OPA have been implemented
by agencies and interpreted by courts as complementary to existing laws,
like the CWA and CERCLA, while other provisions, like the requirement
that vessel and facility operators secure insurance coverage at the
uppermost limits of potential liability45 have elicited some industry
backlash,
Title I, captioned “Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation,” contains
the law’s most novel provisions, imposing on designated responsible parties
(RPs) liability for both removal costs and damages, as well as providing
defenses and limitations on the liability established. The provisions of Title
IV, titled “Prevention and Removal,” amend existing statutory measures –
relating to mariner qualifications and licenses, vessel operational and design
requirements, marine casualty reporting, and more – and direct the
Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating to
implement restrictions on single-hulled tanker operations.46 Indeed, the
Coast Guard is the principal government agency responsible for carrying
into effect OPA’s provisions, both by regulation and enforcement. Where
relevant, notes on the implementing actions are included here.
Other parts of the law are area-specific – provisions applicable only to
Alaskan waters, for example – or are more procedural than substantive,
43. See id.
44. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
45. 33 C.F.R. pt. 138 (2020).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(33). At present, the Coast Guard operates within the Department
of Homeland Security. See 14 U.S.C. § 103.
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such as addressing the relationship with international regimes. Titles I and
IV, however, contain the most consequential provisions, replete with
narrowly defined, precisely tailored language. Statutory analysis at any
depth can be a fraught undertaking, and the goal here is simply to unpack
OPA’s most important rules, as currently codified, in a simple, mechanical
manner, with the best interests (i.e., sanity) of both author and reader at
heart.
Title I: Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation
When a vessel or facility discharges oil, or when there is a substantial
threat of such a discharge, into the navigable waters,47 adjoining shorelines,
or the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)48 of the United States, the RP is
liable for both the costs to remove that oil and damages caused by the
discharge.49 The enactment made RPs “strictly liable for cleanup costs and
damages and first in line to pay any claims for removal costs or damages
that may arise under” the law.50 Indeed, Congress adopted the standard that
existed under section 311 of the CWA: “strict, joint, and several liability”
for “economic damages, as well as for removal costs and natural resource
damages.”51 Determining which party is responsible depends on the
platform involved. In the case of vessels, the RP is “any person owning,
operating, or demise chartering the vessel.”52 For offshore facilities, such as
an oil rig operating the on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), the RP would
be the “lessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is located or the
holder of a right of use and easement” granted under state or federal law.
The text also specifies RPs applicable to onshore facilities, foreign
facilities, deepwater ports, pipelines, and abandoned vessels or facilities.53
47. The term “navigable waters” is defined in this context as “waters of the United
States, including the territorial sea.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(21). This definition has been the
subject of much case law. The “territorial sea” is defined as “the belt of the seas measured
from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact
with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending
seaward a distance of 3 miles.” Id. § 2701(35).
48. The EEZ, generally, extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. See Presidential Proclamation 5030 of Mar. 10,
1983, at 48 FR 10605.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
50. United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 759 F.3d 420, 422 n.2 (5th Cir.
2014).
51. S. REP. NO. 101-94 (1989); 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32).
53. Id.
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Expressly excluded from liability are discharges that are otherwise legally
permitted, or those originating from a public vessel54 or an onshore facility
subject to TAPAA.55 A third party may be treated as an RP if the original
RP can establish that a discharge and resulting removal costs or damages
were caused solely by the act or omission of the third party.56 If the original
RP already incurred removal costs and damages in such a case, that RP is
entitled by subrogation to all rights of the United States and other claimants
to recover removal costs and damages against the third party.57 As detailed
below, certain statutory defenses to liability may be invoked, and liability
limits are set according to the size and type of vessel or facility.
Liability under OPA, as noted, extends to both removal costs and
damages. Removal costs include those incurred – to prevent, minimize or
mitigate pollution after an oil discharge or substantial threat of discharge58 –
by the federal government, a state, or Indian tribe, acting under the CWA,
the Intervention on the High Seas Act59 or state law.60 Cleanup costs
incurred by anyone acting in accord with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) are likewise covered.61 The NCP is essentially the blueprint for the
federal response to oil pollution incidents.62 An RP may also voluntarily
undertake removal operations, the costs of which could be credited against
the total liability imposed by OPA.63 An RP may also be liable for damages
that result from an oil spill incident. This provision, at 33 U.S.C. §
2702(b)(2), is of arguably more consequence than any other in the postExxon Valdez era of oil transport, as it expanded the scope of compensable
losses resulting from an oil spill to an unprecedented class of claimants.
The available damages were divided into six categories:
54. Under OPA, a “public vessel” would be “a vessel owned or bareboat chartered and
operated by the United States, or by a State or political subdivision thereof, or by a foreign
nation, except when the vessel is engaged in commerce.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(29).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 2701(31).
59. Id. § 1471.
60. Id. § 2702.
61. Id. The NCP, first promulgated by the President after the Torrey Canyon incident,
derives from section 311(d) of the CWA.
62. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2021). Under the NCP, a response involves four sequential
phases: discovery or notification; preliminary assessment and initiation of action;
containment, countermeasures, cleanup, and disposal; and documentation and cost recovery.
See id.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a).
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(A) Natural resources: Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of,
or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing the damage, which shall be recoverable by a
United States trustee, a State trustee, an Indian tribe trustee, or a
foreign trustee.
(B) Real or personal property: Damages for injury to, or economic
losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property,
which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases
that property.
(C) Subsistence use: Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural
resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so
uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or
lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the
resources.
(D) Revenues: Damages equal to the net loss of taxes, royalties,
rents, fees, or net profit shares due to the injury, destruction, or
loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources,
which shall be recoverable by the Government of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.
(E) Profits and earning capacity: Damages equal to the loss of profits
or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction,
or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources,
which shall be recoverable by any claimant.
(F) Public services: Damages for net costs of providing increased or
additional public services during or after removal activities,
including protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, caused
by a discharge of oil, which shall be recoverable by a State, or a
political subdivision of a State.64
To spare the reader from a lengthy transcription of less-than-exciting
statutory text, this list suffices to demonstrate the expansive breadth of
qualifying claims under OPA. A few brief clarifying remarks, however, are
warranted. While the scope of each category is provided, one must thumb
through the Title to discern the important meanings of included terms. As
an example, Congress defined “natural resources,” from paragraph (A), as
“land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies,
64. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
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and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by,
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by” the federal, state or local
government, Indian tribe or foreign government.65 Natural resource damage
assessments are carried out in accord with the regulations at 15 C.F.R. §
990. Also noteworthy is the inclusion of damages for profit losses and the
impairment of earning capacity, in paragraph (E). Under the pre-OPA
Robins Dry Dock precedent, economic losses – absent direct physical harm
or damage to person or proprietary assets – were not compensable.
Available defenses are provided: An RP may present evidence the
discharge or threat of discharge was caused solely by an act of God, an act
of war, an act or omission of a third party.66 However, defenses are not
available should an RP fail or refuse to report an incident or cooperate and
assist with removal activities as directed by a responsible official, or
otherwise fail to comply with applicable orders issued.67 Importantly, states
are free to impose additional liability or requirements, as well as establish
and maintain funds related to oil pollution in respective jurisdictional
waters.68
Congress increased the limits of liability previously available under the
CWA in the case of an oil spill, as well as expressly superseded the marine
casualty limits imposed by the Limitation Act.69 Particular limits vary
according to size and type of vessel or facility. Under the current scheme,
an RP’s liability after an incident involving a double-hulled tank vessel
would be the greater of $2,300 per gross ton of the vessel or $19.9
million.70 For such vessels measuring 3,000 gross tons or less, the cap is set
at $4.9 million.71 In the case of an offshore facility (e.g., a drilling platform
on the OCS), liability is limited to the total of all removal costs plus $137.6
million.72 These amounts reflect the regulatory inflation increases as
implemented by the Coast Guard in 201973 and the Bureau of Ocean Energy

65. Id. § 2701(20).
66. Id. § 2703.
67. Id.
68. See id. § 2718.
69. Id. 2718(c).
70. 33 C.F.R. § 138.230 (2020).
71. Id.
72. 30 C.F.R. § 553.702 (2021).
73. See Consumer Price Index Adjustments of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Limits of
Liability—Vessels, Deepwater Ports and Onshore Facilities, 84 Fed. Reg. 39970 (Aug. 13,
2019).
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Management (BOEM) in 2018.74 These liability limits would not apply if
the incident were proximately caused by the RP’s gross negligence or
willful misconduct, or violation of an applicable federal safety,
construction, or operating regulation.75 Nor is liability limited when the RP
fails or refuses to report the incident as required, to cooperate and assist as
requested by a responsible official, or fails to comply with a lawful order.76
Under OPA, most vessels operating in U.S. waters must obtain “evidence of
financial responsibility sufficient to meet the maximum amount of liability
to which the responsible party could be subjected” under the law.77 The
requirement applies to all vessels over 300 gross tons and tank vessels of
more than 100 gross tons.78 Non-compliance could result in a vessel’s
clearance being withheld by the federal government, the denial or detention
of the vessel, or the seizure and forfeiture of the vessel to the United
States.79
Finally, OPA activated the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF),
which had lain dormant since being established by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986,80 as the primary federal funding source for oil removal and
uncompensated damages.81 In 1991, the President delegated administration
of the OSLTF to the Coast Guard, which stood up the National Pollution
Funds Center (NPFC) to manage the fund.82 Under OPA, uses of the fund
include: payment of removal costs as determined by Federal On-Scene
Coordinators (FOSCs) consistent with the NCP, payment to states for
removal actions, and payment of claims for uncompensated removal costs
and damages.83 The fund has derived revenue from sources such as a perbarrel tax imposed on the industry, transfers from other pollution funds, and
the recovery from RPs of costs incurred by the fund.84 Expenditures from
the OSLTF for any singular oil pollution incident are limited by statute to

74. See Oil Spill Financial Responsibility Adjustment of the Limit of Liability for
Offshore Facilities, 83 Fed. Reg. 2540 (Jan. 18, 2018).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1).
76. Id. § 2704(c)(2).
77. Id. § 2716(a).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 2716(b).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 9509.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 2712.
82. See Exec. Order No. 12777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (Oct. 22, 1991).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 2712.
84. See U.S. COAST GUARD, NPFC MISSION OVERVIEW, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/
0/NPFC/docs/PDFs/Reports/Mission_Overview_2008.pdf.
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$1 billion.85 States may access up to $250,000 for immediate response to an
oil spill incident.86 Costs of containing and removing oil from water and
shorelines, preventing or minimizing a substantial threat of discharge, and
monitoring the activities of RPs are authorized.87 Removal costs may
include cleanup contract services, equipment for removal, chemical testing
to determine the source of oil, disposal of oil and debris, costs of
government personnel for the duration of response, among others.88
Title IV: Prevention and Removal
OPA’s first title is primarily concerned with adjudicative and
administrative activities associated with an oil spill. The content of its
fourth title, by contrast, is mostly of practical, rubber-meets-road
orientation, laying out requirements for vessel operations and design
characteristics, along with provisions that pertain to disaster planning and
response.89 Many of the rules hearken directly back to the details of the
Exxon Valdez grounding. Procedurally, Title IV amends various existing
statutes, including the CWA, the National Driver Register Act,90 the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA),91 and the Merchant Marine Act.92
These amendments were enacted in a scattershot sequence; Title IV is more
practical in substance than Title I and less natural in form.
The manning of tank vessels is a central concern. The issuance and
renewal, at five-year intervals, of merchant mariner documents became
contingent upon motor vehicle driving and criminal records checks, as well
as chemical testing for dangerous drugs.93 A suspension and revocation
process was also established, under which mariners must undergo
preemployment, periodic, random, reasonable cause, and post-accident
alcohol and drug testing.94 Suspension or revocation could also result from
“an act of incompetence, misconduct, or negligence” when acting under the
authority of a license.95 Another provision prescribes mutinous procedures
85. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c).
86. 33 C.F.R. pt. 133 (2020).
87. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 84.
88. See id.
89. The title is divided into three sections, titled “Prevention,” “Removal,” and
“Penalties and Miscellaneous.”
90. Pub. L. No. 97-364, 96 Stat. 1740 (1982).
91. Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972).
92. Ch. 858, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936).
93. 46 U.S.C. § 7101.
94. Id. § 7702.
95. Id. § 7703.
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to be taken when the two “next most senior licensed officers on a vessel
reasonably believe that the master or individual in charge of the vessel is
under the influence of alcohol or a dangerous drug and is incapable of
commanding the vessel.”96 In such an instance, the next most senior master,
mate, or operator is to take command of the ship and report the incident to
the Coast Guard.97 Another provision requires any instance of “significant
harm to the environment” to be reported.98 Watches are also restricted: “On
a tanker, a licensed individual or seaman may not be permitted to work
more than 15 hours in any 24-hour period, or more than 36 hours in any 72hour period, except in an emergency or a drill.”99 Congress also directed the
Coast Guard to evaluate and prioritize ports and channels in need of
expanded vessel traffic service (VTS) systems, which monitor and control
vessel movements in designated zones.100
There are also extensive design and construction requirements, such as
rules for periodic gauging of hull thickness on tank vessels, aimed at the
timely diagnosis of steel corrosion and deterioration, and the installation of
cargo level monitoring and tank pressure warning devices.101 In 1993, the
Coast Guard published a final rule modifying 46 C.F.R. Subchapter D to
establish minimum longitudinal strength and plating thickness standards
and require periodic gauging for tank vessels.102 Section 4115 of OPA
outlined an incremental, 25-year phase-out schedule for single-skin barges
and tankers, a rule implemented by the Coast Guard at 33 C.F.R. § 157.
And, since the start of 2015, in accord therewith, only double-hull vessels
have been permitted to carry oil as cargo in the United States. The move to
decommission single-hulled tank vessels, adding an extra barrier between
oil and sea, was ahead of its time – the international maritime community
took another two years to adopt similar standards103 – and has proved
beneficial. A 2019 study found that as oil trade volume has increased

96. Id. § 8101(i).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 6101.
99. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4114(b).
100. Id. § 4107(b).
101. Id. §§ 4109, 4110.
102. See Requirements for Longitudinal Strength, Plating Thickness, and Periodic
Gauging for Certain Tank Vessels, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,602 (Oct. 8, 1993).
103. See Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, INT’L MARITIME ORG.,
MEPC.52(32) (Mar. 6, 1992), https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/Knowledge Centre/
IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDocuments/MEPC.52(32).pdf.
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worldwide, oil spillage from tankers has steadily declined.104 The study
identified 19 major accidents, causing upward of 2.3 million tons of oil
spilled, that occurred between 1970 and 2000.105 Over the two decades that
followed, there had been only two such accidents, spilling 74,000 tons of
oil.106 The researchers noted that this trend occurred as “tankers began to
adopt double-hull design . . . which can greatly reduce oil pollution after
accidents.”107 As of February 2021, there had been 83 vessel discharge
incidents in U.S. waters resulting in damages that exceeded OPA liability
limits since 1991, and none of these was caused by a double-hull tanker.108
Provisions that concern planning and response consist almost exclusively
of amendments to the FWPCA. Congress painted with broad strokes here,
directing the President “to ensure effective and immediate removal of a
discharge, and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat of a
discharge” of oil, following the NCP.109 The requisite content of that plan is
specified, including the assignment of duties and responsibilities to various
federal, state, and local agencies to “provide for efficient, coordinated, and
effective action to minimize” oil spill damage.110 Other NCP elements: a
ready supply of removal assets and chemicals, deployable “strike teams” in
the Coast Guard, designated FOSCs assigned to subordinate Area
Contingency Plans (ACPs), and a fish and wildlife response plan.111
Congress also called for a national response office, to coordinate and assist
area committees and area-specific FOSCs, and response groups at Coast
Guard district offices.112 Tank vessels, offshore facilities, and some onshore
facilities must produce response plans, subject to government review and
approval, as well as maintain relevant equipment, conduct periodic
response drills, and more.113 Finally, OPA established a schedule of
administrative penalties for non-compliance114 and civil penalties for

104. Jihong Chen, et al., Oil spills from global tankers: Status review and future
governance, 227 JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION 22-24 (2019).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See U.S. COAST GUARD, OIL POLLUTION ACT LIABILITY LIMITS IN 2020 (Feb. 22,
2021).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c).
110. Id. § 1321(d).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 1321(j).
113. 33 C.F.R. pt. 155 (2020).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6).
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discharges.115 While maximum amounts of these penalties are stipulated,
factors to be considered in the actual imposition of administrative or civil
penalties are given.116 The FWPCA was also amended to add negligent and
knowing discharges to its criminal enforcement section, codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1319.117
Concerns and Commentary
After the conference committee produced a consolidated bill that both
chambers approved, not quite 18 months after the Exxon Valdez weighed
anchor and set sail from the port of Valdez, President Bush signed OPA
into law on August 18, 1990.118 In a signing statement, the President
remarked the legislation “strengthen[ed] the protection of our
environment.”119 More ink, however, was devoted to shortcomings than
superlatives. Thus, oddly enough, a convenient approach to outlining the
contemporary criticisms of OPA is to consider those expressed by the man
whose signature turned H.R. 1465 into Public Law 101-380.
President Bush laid out three primary concerns. First, section 6003
introduced a moratorium on oil and gas exploration off North Carolina’s
shores. The restriction, President Bush argued, was antithetical to the policy
objective of energy independence, the primacy of which had been
articulated by President Nixon soon after an oil embargo in the Middle East
in the early 1970s.120 Within section 6003, titled the Outer Banks Protection
Act (OBPA), Congress noted inadequate environmental impact research off
North Carolina’s shores, an area of “exceptional environmental fragility and
beauty.”121 President Bush, on the other hand, focused on the reserves of
natural gas trapped beneath that beauty, the extraction of which “could be

115. Id. § 1321(b)(7).
116. Id. § 1321(b)(8). Relevant factors include the economic benefit to the violator, if
any, resulting from the violation, the degree of culpability involved, any other penalty for the
same incident, any history of prior violations, the nature, extent, and degree of success of
any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge, the economic
impact of the penalty on the violator, and any other matters as justice may require. Id.
117. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4301(c).
118. To become law, a bill that has passed through the House of Representatives and the
Senate must be presented to and signed by the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
119. Presidential Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1265 (Aug. 27, 1990).
120. Gordon L. James, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978:
Balancing Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns?, 40 LA. L. REV. 177, 185 (1979).
121. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 6003(b)(1).
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used to offset our dependence on foreign energy sources.”122 Moreover, he
wrote, “exploration for gas this far offshore carries little environmental
risk.” He called the provision “short-sighted” and “highly objectionable.”
Next, the President lamented the Senate’s failure to ratify and implement
certain international compensation regimes, citing concern over access to
those funding sources and timely recouping of damages in the case of a
foreign tanker spilling oil in U.S. waters. Inaction, he added, could lead to
diminished American influence in global maritime rulemaking or perhaps
lead larger oil shippers, wary of risk, to avoid U.S. ports, “replaced by
smaller companies with limited assets and reduced ability to pay for the
cleanup of oil spills.”123 Finally, President Bush highlighted another
provision, section 3004, which violated the separation of powers in his
estimation. As enacted, that section could be interpreted as requiring the
President to “encourage appropriate international organizations to establish
an international inventory of spill removal equipment and personnel.”124 As
implemented, the mandate would be construed as merely advisory,
according to the signing statement.
It is worthwhile to consider whether fears ever materialized into fact and
whether foresight in the past aligns with hindsight in the present. In this
case, such a retrospective analysis would necessarily owe a degree of
deference to the 41st chief executive, whose concerns were conveyed
without the clarity afforded by the past three decades of lived experience.
That said, the first prediction – that a conditional prohibition on drilling off
North Carolina would likely prevent or forestall a reduction in foreign oil
dependence – seems to have been both unfounded and overstated. OBPA
did not establish an unqualified ban on drilling in the area specified.
Instead, the law stipulated a series of steps and studies to be completed
before the Secretary of the Interior could conduct a lease sale, issue any
new leases, approve any exploration plan, approve any development and
production plan, approve any application for a permit to drill, or permit any
drilling on the OCS offshore North Carolina.125 Specifically, an
Environmental Sciences Review Panel would first produce a report with
recommendations. Then, the Interior Secretary, the executive officer
charged with leasing oversight under OCSLA, would certify to Congress –
which must have been in continuous session for 45 days – that ecological,
122. Presidential Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1265 (Aug. 27, 1990).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 6003(c).
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socioeconomic, oceanographic, and environmental studies had been
undertaken, yielding sufficient information on the impact of drilling off
North Carolina.126 Finally, even if all those boxes were checked, no
approvals or permits were to be issued before October 1991.127 Onerous as
they were, these conditions hardly seem “short-sighted.” Consider that,
according to OPA’s legislative history, section 6003 was the result of a
particular proposal by Mobil Oil Corporation to drill an exploratory well 40
miles off Cape Hatteras.128 And while President Bush singled out natural
gas in the statement – calling it a “relatively clean energy source” – the
House Conference Report noted: “While the Mobil Oil Company expects
exploration offshore North Carolina to yield a natural gas discovery, they
have indicated a possibility that oil may be discovered . . . .”129 In his
statement, President Bush also asserted that operations “over 38 miles
offshore” presented a minimal environmental risk. Twenty years later, of
course, an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon – 41 miles off Louisiana’s
coast – resulted in the worst spill in U.S. history.130 OBPA, incidentally, did
not survive its first decade; section 6003 was unceremoniously repealed in
1996.131 Even so, there is no record of any exploration, let alone drilling, for
oil or gas off North Carolina’s coast since OPA was enacted.132 Yet

126. Id. § 6003(d).
127. Id. § 6003(c)(3)(A)(i).
128. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-653 (1990).
129. Id. Mobil Oil and its partners had actually paid the U.S. government $156 million in
1981 for 10-year renewable lease contracts giving them rights to explore for and develop oil
off the North Carolina coast. Citing OPA, the Secretary of the Interior suspended the leases.
In 2000, the resulting dispute reached the Supreme Court. Justice Breyer, applying contract
law principles, required restitution: “[T]he Government broke its promise; it repudiated the
contracts; and it must give the companies their money back.” Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing
Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000).
130. See Lisa Friedman, Ten Years After Deepwater Horizon, U.S. Is Still Vulnerable to
Catastrophic Spills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/
climate/ deepwater-horizon-anniversary.html.
131. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 §
109.
132. Historical data from BOEM show the last lease sale in its Mid-Atlantic region,
which includes the seabed off North Carolina, occurred in April 1983. See Atlantic OCS
Lease Status Information, U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.
gov/oil-gas-energy/atlantic-ocs-lease-status-information (last visited May 7, 2021). In 2000,
the interests in the last remaining oil and natural gas leases off North Carolina were
relinquished. Atlantic OCS Facts and Figures, U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
https://www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/atlantic-ocs-facts-and-figures (last visited May 7,
2021).
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America has indeed weaned itself off foreign oil, thanks largely to
innovations in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. And while a
deep dive into the global oil economy is beyond the scope of this paper (and
the knowledge of its author), some perspective here is useful. Imports of
crude oil and petroleum products have steadily trended downward since the
mid-aughts. For reference, these imports averaged 6,350,000 barrels per
day during the week ending February 19, 2021.133 The last time a weekly
average was that low was almost exactly 30 years before, in the week
ending February 22, 1991.134 Meanwhile, crude oil and petroleum exports
have steadily trended upward, most dramatically since a four-decade ban on
shipments to most countries was lifted in 2016.135 On average, the United
States exported 8,508,000 barrels of crude oil and petroleum products per
day in 2020; in 1990, when OPA became law, those exports totaled 857,000
barrels per day.136 Considering that the United States has become a net
exporter, one might assume concern over untapped reserves in the midAtlantic would be suitably assuaged. Not so. The specter of ugly oil rigs
spoiling beachfront views on the Outer Banks made headlines in 2018 when
President Trump announced his Interior Department would renew offshore
leasing activity along the Eastern Seaboard and elsewhere.137 After intense
opposition from the affected states, the President reversed course, imposing
a 10-year moratorium on the exploration, development, or production of oil
or gas off North Carolina.138
President Bush referenced two international regimes in the signing
statement, bemoaning Congress’s failure to ratify either. The 1984
Protocols of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC), adopted in 1969 after Torrey Canyon, established
a strict liability scheme and imposed compulsory oil pollution insurance for
133. Weekly U.S. Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=wttimus2&f=w (last
visited May 12, 2022).
134. Id.
135. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242.
136. U.S. Exports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbblpd_m.htm (last visited
May 12, 2022).
137. See Timothy Puko & Lynn Cook, Trump Administration Proposes Massive
Expansion of Oil Drilling, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/ trump-administration-proposes-massive-expansion-of-oil-drilling-1515090515.
138. Trump extends drilling ban off North Carolina, REUTERS (Sep. 25, 2020), https://
www.reuters.com/article/ usa-offshore-drilling-north-carolina/trump-extends-drilling-banoff-north-carolina-idINL2N2GN00H.
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shippers.139 The CLC was augmented by the International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (FUND92), which adjusted liability limits and sought to
ensure full compensation would be available to victims of oil pollution
incidents.140 Both conventions have undergone extensive revisions in the
years since, yet the United States remains a party to neither.141 But nonratification of these two schemes hardly points to a decline in U.S.
influence at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United
Nations (UN) agency responsible for the regulation of the global shipping
industry. A member state since 1950, the United States has maintained a
prominent presence at the biennial IMO Assembly and in policymaking
committees, and the American delegation was reelected to the IMO
Council, the agency’s executive arm, in 2021.142 As of May 2022, the
United States had ratified 28 other IMO conventions.143 These include
several of particular relevance here, such as the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which prescribes safety and security
standards for merchant ships; Annex I of the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which outlines design,
equipment, operational and recordkeeping rules specific to oil tankers; and
the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), which sets minimum training and
watchkeeping standards for the crews of seagoing vessels. Moreover, the
international community has acknowledged that hardy liability schemes
adopted domestically can negate the need to contract and coordinate with
other countries. In a 2012 report, the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTD) noted that while, generally, contracting parties to
such legal instruments are better positioned to deal with the financial
consequences of a tanker spill, “in some cases, substantial compensation
may be available under applicable national law, as for instance in the case
of the United States Oil Pollution Act 1990.”144

139. See Donaldson, supra note 31, at 301-05.
140. See id.
141. Status of Conventions, INT’L MARITIME ORG., https://www.imo.org/en/About/Con
ventions/Pages/StatusOfConventions.aspx (last visited May 12, 2022).
142. See IMO Council Members (2022-2023), INT’L MARITIME ORG., https://www.imo.
org/ en/About/Pages/Council-2022-2023.aspx (last visited May 12, 2022).
143. See INT’L MARITIME ORG, supra note 141.
144. Liability and Compensation for Ship-Source Oil Pollution: An Overview of the
International Legal Framework for Oil Pollution Damage from Tankers, UNCTAD (2012),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtltlb20114_en.pdf.
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President Bush’s concern that larger oil shippers would be replaced by
smaller, judgment-proof companies echoed murmurs that spread throughout
the shipping industry in the early 1990s, during OPA’s drafting and after its
passage. While the President tethered this concern to congressional inaction
vis-à-vis international protocols, there were specific conditions within OPA
that presaged even more dramatic reactions from the industry. For example,
OPA expressly preserved states’ authority to impose additional liability,
fines, or penalties relating to the discharge or substantial threat of a
discharge of oil. These saving clauses, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718, meant
state legislatures could adopt liability and cleanup schemes unfettered by
either OPA or the Limitation Act. Another provision, at § 2716(a), required
owners of larger vessels to produce evidence of financial responsibility
sufficient to meet the liability limits to which an RP could be subjected
under § 2704. In combination, these rules unsettled some regulated entities.
Within a year of enactment, an association of tanker owners threatened to
boycott U.S. ports because of the potentially unlimited liability created by
the federal-state interplay.145 Protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs,
meanwhile, threatened not to issue the required documentation of financial
responsibility required by OPA.146 These threats did not materialize into
any appreciable impact on the U.S. market,147 although isolated avoidance
activities have been observed in the industry, such as the trend of singlevessel corporations being established as a mode of limiting exposure.148
Questions for Courts
Most recently, in its 2019-20 term, the Supreme Court took up a case in
which OPA liability provisions were at issue, although Justice Sotomayor’s
majority decision hinged on maritime contract rather than statutory
interpretation. Nevertheless, CITGO Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Frescati Shipping
Co., Ltd., bears emphasizing as its facts are paradigmatic of the sequences
that give rise to liability under OPA.149 The case is also noteworthy for its
complex, serpentine procedural history – lasting 16 years – and the
legislative response to the underlying oil spill. In November 2004, the
Athos I, a Cypriot-flagged, Greek-owned, 748-foot, single-hulled oil tanker,
145. See Donaldson, supra note 31, at 313-17.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See generally, Inho Kim, Financial Responsibility Rules under the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 565 (2002).
149. 140 S. Ct. 1081 (2020).
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laden with nearly 14 million gallons of crude oil, maneuvered on the
Delaware River toward the CITGO terminal at Paulsboro, N.J.150 The ship
had sailed 1,900 miles from Venezuela and came within 900 tantalizing feet
of its destination, a berth at an asphalt refinery dock when its bottom struck
an abandoned anchor, known to have been lying on the riverbed since
2001.151 Its shell pierced, the Athos I released 264,321 gallons of
Venezuelan crude into the channel that divides Pennsylvania and New
Jersey.152 Frescati, the shipowner, ponied up $45 million in cleanup costs –
then the maximum liability for that type and size of the vessel – and the
federal government, drawing from the OSLTF, reimbursed the company for
another $88 million expended to clean up the mess.153 That’s where things
get weird. Frescati had entered a contract with Star Tankers, an operator of
tankships, under a time charter agreement. Star Tankers, as an intermediary,
assigned the ship to a tanker pool, from which CARCO – the collective
name of various CITGO entities – sub-chartered the ship to deliver crude
oil from Puerto Miranda, Venezuela, to its berth in Paulsboro. At the time
of the spill, CARCO functioned as both the shipping customer and the
wharfinger operating the berth.154 After the cleanup, Frescati and the United
States, as subrogee, sued CARCO to recover their respective portions of
cleanup expenses. CARCO advanced several defenses, including the theory
that a safe-berth clause within the charter agreement, known in admiralty as
a “charter party,” only imposed a duty of care in designating a safe berth at
which the Athos I would conduct cargo operations. The matter bounced
multiple times between the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Third
Circuit before reaching the Supreme Court, where seven justices agreed the
dispute sounded in contract law rather than torts, and the charter party’s
plain language imposed a warranty of safety, thereby imposing liability on
CARCO.155 Congress had already taken action, passing a law in 2006 to
triple fines under OPA for single-hulled vessels and require anyone with
150. Jason George, Delaware River Oil Spill Leaves Wildlife Imperiled, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/29/nyregion/delaware-river-oil-spillleaves-wildlife-imperiled.html.
151. See In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 886 F.3d 291, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2018), aff'd sub
nom. CITGO Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 140 S. Ct. 1081 (2020); see
also Citgo cleared of $177M cleanup of Delaware River in Paulsboro after 2004 oil spill,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 15, 2011, updated Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/
2011/04/ citgo_cleared_of_177m_cleanup.html.
152. See CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1085.
153. Id. at 1087.
154. See id. at 1085.
155. See id. at 1093.
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knowledge of possible river obstructions to make a report to the Coast
Guard and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).156
An RP, in the case of a vessel, is defined in OPA as “any person owning,
operating, or demise chartering the vessel.”157 The statutory definition of a
vessel’s “owner or operator” is “any person owning, operating, or
chartering by demise, the vessel.”158 In 2018, the Fifth Circuit considered
these circular definitions in a case that involved the assignment of liability
to a tugboat attached to a barge that discharged oil while in tow. In United
States v. Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C., a towing vessel was moving two oilcarrying barges – themselves not self-propelled – down the Mississippi
River when one of the barges struck a bridge, spilling more than 7,000
gallons of its payload into the waterway.159 The Coast Guard designated the
respective owners of both tugboat and barge as RPs, and the tugboat owner
ultimately spent $2.99 million on the cleanup.160 Various government
entities spent another $792,000.161 The tugboat owner then sought
reimbursement from the NPFC, asserting that its liability ought to only be
calculated based on the tonnage of the tugboat – not the towing package’s
aggregate tonnage.162 As noted, in most cases, OPA limits an RP’s liability
based on the tonnage of the vessel(s) being operated.163 The NPFC denied
the claim, determining the tugboat owner was indeed “operating” the barge
by towing it, and the federal government moved to recover its costs.164 To
resolve the ambiguity presented by OPA, the Fifth Circuit panel looked to
case law emanating from CERCLA, which presented identical definitional
language.165 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bestfoods, had
determined the ordinary, natural meaning of “operator” under CERCLA
was “someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the
affairs of a facility.”166 Adopting that standard, the Fifth Circuit held that
the scope of OPA liability, as applied to “operators,” extended to the act of
piloting or moving a vessel – in this case, exercising exclusive navigational
156. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-241, 120
Stat. 516.
157. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A).
158. Id. § 2701(26)(A).
159. United States v. Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C., 904 F.3d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 2018).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
164. See Nature’s Way Marine, 904 F.3d at 418.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20).
166. 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998).
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control of a barge through a river.167 Summary judgment for the
government was affirmed.
OPA, as noted, imposes liability for removal costs and damages in the
case of actual or threatened discharges of oil “into or upon the navigable
waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone.”168 The
question of what constitutes “navigability” in the legal sense is a prickly
one, and at the federal level, no fewer than four doctrinal foundations have
been established. These pertain to: (1) the constitutional limits of Article III
admiralty jurisdiction; (2) the federal regulatory authority under the
Commerce Clause of Article I; (3) the navigational servitude and the
potential imposition of federal projects on private parties; and (4) the
determination of the ownership of the beds and banks of waters.169 The
traditional definition of navigability under the Commerce Clause
formulation was laid out in 1870 by Justice Field, who pointed to
“navigational capacity” in The Daniel Ball, a case involving a steamer that
operated on an intrastate river in Michigan.170 Such waterways were
deemed “navigable” if they were navigable in fact, meaning “they are used,
or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute
navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of
Congress . . . when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or
by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is
or may be carried on with other State or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.”171 Aligning with
the general expansion of congressional Commerce Clause power from the
New Deal until the mid-1990s,172 the navigability framework established in
The Daniel Ball broadened progressively during that period. For example,
in 1940, the Supreme Court added the concept of potentiality, permitting
regulation by the Federal Power Commission of hydroelectric dam

167. See Nature’s Way Marine, 904 F.3d at 421.
168. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
169. See ROBERT W. ADLER, ET AL., MODERN WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC
RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 343 (2d ed. 2018).
170. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
171. Id. at 563.
172. This period spanned from 1937 to 1995, bookended by a pair of Supreme Court
decisions on the limits of congressional power. See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also United States v Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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construction on waters that could become navigable after improvements.173
Since the 1970s, most of the doctrinal movement in this area has resulted
from the implementation of environmental protection laws like the CWA,
in which “navigable waters” were defined by Congress as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.”174 In 1985, the Court upheld
particularly expansive rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and USACE in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries were
regulable under the CWA.175 There, the lands at issue formed part of a
wetland directly abutting a navigable-in-fact creek.176 In 2001, this question
arose yet again when the USACE asserted jurisdiction over an abandoned
mining site with remnant excavation trenches that had “evolve[ed] into a
scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds.”177 The Court, tightening the
regulatory leash, clarified that isolated, non-navigable waters such as these
were beyond USACE’s jurisdiction.178
Under OPA, the term “navigable waters” means “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial sea.”179 By design, this definition
matches the definition appearing in the CWA. The House Conference
Report on OPA explained that “navigable waters” and related terms “shall
have the same meaning in this legislation as they do under the [CWA] and
shall be interpreted accordingly.”180 The Senate Report likewise noted that
OPA “covers all the bodies of water and resources covered by section 311
[of the CWA], including the inland waters of the United States and the
living and non-living resources of the [OCS] and of ocean waters out to 200
miles offshore.”181 OPA is a younger, smaller piece of legislation than the
CWA, and accordingly, fewer cases dealing with the former than the latter
have percolated in the federal judiciary. However, given the identical
statutory language and the supporting legislative history, it stands to reason
that interpretations of navigability, under both statutes, would dovetail in
the courts. In one of the few OPA-specific cases on this issue, called In re
173. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
175. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
176. See id. at 131.
177. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
178. See id.
179. Id. § 2701(21).
180. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-653 (1990).
181. S. REP. NO. 101-94 (1989).
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Needham, the Fifth Circuit in 2003 considered whether the liability
provisions applied when a pumper/gauger at a facility called Thibodeaux
Well, in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana, pumped oil from a containment basin
into an adjacent drainage ditch.182 The RP hired a private contractor to
perform the necessary cleanup but lacked the resources to finish the job, so
the EPA and Coast Guard assumed responsibility, drawing from the
OSLTF. The RP then filed for bankruptcy, and the federal government sued
to recoup $207,000 in cleanup costs.183 The Fifth Circuit clarified that OPA
did not permit federal regulation over “puddles, sewers, roadside ditches
and the like,”184 but in this case, based on stipulated facts, liability was
appropriate because the discharged oil had drained into Bayou Folse, which
was adjacent (i.e., “sufficiently linked”) to an open body of navigable
water, the Company Canal.185 Yet the holding articulated by the court was
rather narrow: “[T]he OPA permits the recovery of cleanup costs in only
two instances: (1) if oil spills into navigable-in-fact waters or (2) if oil spills
into non-navigable waters (or wetlands) that are truly adjacent to an open
body of navigable water.”186 Three years later, the Supreme Court ventured,
once again, into this definitional fray, and in a 4-1-4 decision in Rapanos v.
United States, tenuously settled the matter.187 The plurality, led by Justice
Scalia, parsed the statutory language in exacting detail. Observing the CWA
defined “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States,” Scalia
seized upon the definite article (“the”) and plural number (“waters”) chosen
by Congress to argue the statute applied to particular bodies of water – not
water in general – meaning “those relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are
described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and]
lakes.’”188 Federal regulatory jurisdiction, therefore, extended at its
outermost reach to “only those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own
right.”189 Justice Kennedy, the outlier, authored a concurring opinion in
Rapanos that would become the leading interpretation for lower courts. He
reasoned that water or a wetland would fall within the CWA’s ambit so
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

354 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2003).
See id.
Id. at 345-47.
See id.
Id.
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 742 (emphasis in original).
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long as it possessed a “significant nexus” to waters that are navigable in
fact or could reasonably become so.190 A wetland would “possess the
requisite nexus” if it “either alone or in combination with similarly situated
lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
‘navigable.’”191 Not everyone was satisfied with the failure of consensus
and clarity at the high court. In an OPA case two weeks after Rapanos, a
federal judge in Texas observed that Justice Kennedy “advanced an
ambiguous test – whether a ‘significant nexus’ exists to waters that
are/were/might be navigable,” adding that “[t]his test leaves no guidance on
how to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly what is
‘significant’ and how is a ‘nexus’ determined?”192
A final case warranting inclusion here is United States v. Locke, from
2000, in which the Supreme Court considered whether states were free,
based on the OPA saving clauses at 33 U.S.C. § 2702, to double down on
oil tanker requirements.193 Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the state of
Washington created an agency called the Office of Marine Safety, which
was tasked with establishing standards that provided the “best achievable
protection” from oil spill damages.194 The state agency promulgated tanker
design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements, and a trade group
brought suit. A unanimous Court ruled that most of Washington’s rules,
including those about navigation watch procedures, crew language skills
and training, and maritime casualty reporting, were indeed preempted by
federal law.195 The OPA saving clauses were of no assistance to the state,
primarily because of where they appeared in the statute – in Title I, which
concerned liability and compensation for oil pollution, not vessel operation,
design, or manning.196 Those rules, as reflected above, appear principally in
Title IV.
Conclusion
To the casual observer, OPA might be dismissed as just another
environmental law, stuffed somewhere amid the heap of those passed in the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
Id. at 780.
United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
529 U.S. 89 (2000).
Id. at 97.
See id. at 116-17.
See id. at 105.
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latter decades of the twentieth century. After all, distilled to its core
components, OPA simply advanced the self-evident proposition that those
who dump pollutants into the water ought to pay for the damage caused.
Yet OPA stands for much more than just that. It represents an era in which
government actors on opposing sides of the aisle could work together,
fashion legislation, and fix problems, even setting the pace for the world
writ large. Compromise is a precious commodity – more valuable than
Alaskan North Slope crude – and demand has outpaced supply. The legacy
of OPA is buttressed, not besmirched, by President Bush’s signing
statement. His criticisms are a testament to a time when adversarial forces
could align, maybe with a grumble here or there, to effectuate a purpose
greater than party loyalties. In this era of entrenchment, OPA offers a
profound lesson and a simple question. We’ve done this before. Could we
do it again?
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